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Summary
The transmission of cultural knowledge requires
learners to identify what relevant information to retain
and selectively imitate when observing others’ skills.
Young human infants—without relying on language
or theory of mind—already show evidence of this abil-
ity. If, for example, in a communicative context, a model
demonstrates a head action instead of a more efficient
hand action, infants imitate the head action only if the
demonstrator had no good reason to do so, suggesting
that their imitation is a selective, interpretative process
[1]. Early sensitivity to ostensive-communicative cues
and to the efficiency of goal-directed actions is thought
to be a crucial prerequisite for such relevance-guided
selective imitation [2]. Although this competence is
thought to be human specific [2], here we show an an-
alog capacity in the dog. In our experiment, subjects
watched a demonstrator dog pulling a rod with the
paw instead of the preferred mouth action. In the first
group, using the ‘‘inefficient’’ action was justified by
the model’s carrying of a ball in her mouth, whereas
in the second group, no constraints could explain the
demonstrator’s choice. In the first trial after observa-
tion, dogs imitated the nonpreferred action only in
the second group. Consequently, dogs, like children,
demonstrated inferential selective imitation.
Results
Recent advances in child psychology demonstrate that
already 3- to 12-month-old infants interpret others’ be-
havior as goal directed [3–8] and, as a result, predict
the most efficient action to achieve a goal within the con-
straints of a given situation [9]. This inferential compe-
tence does not require the attribution of mental states
to others but relies simply on the evaluation of the ob-
servable facts: the action, the goal state, and the situa-
tional constraints [9]. One situation in which human
*Correspondence: friederike.range@univie.ac.atinfants are thought to manifest this nonmentalistic infer-
ential process is their selective imitation of goal-directed
actions. Fourteen-month-old children, who watched
a demonstrator illuminate a light-box by leaning forward
and touching its top with her forehead while her hands
were occupied (pretending to be cold and holding
a blanket wrapped around herself with both hands),
did not imitate the head action but used predominately
the more efficient method (touching the box with their
hands) to achieve the goal [1]. If, however, the less effec-
tive action (head) is demonstrated without any obvious
reason to do so, they do copy the demonstrated action.
Interestingly, for copying to occur, it also seems to be
necessary that the demonstration is accompanied by
communicative cues of the model targeted at the infants
[2]. One hypothesis currently discussed to explain the
importance of the communicative context is that the
ostensive cues (e.g., eye contact and addressing
the subject) given by the model might induce in infants
a special interpretational attitude, thus making them
receptive toward novel information that violates their ex-
pectation of efficiency and preparing them to learn this
information quickly and persistently.
Exceptional among nonhuman animals, domestic
dogs are also sensitive to human-given communicative
cues [10–12] and can easily be trained to perform ac-
tions that are not causally linked to a reward [13]. These
abilities are probably affected by domestication [14, 15].
On the other hand, dogs, like other animal species, opti-
mize their behavior on the basis of efficiency, for in-
stance, choosing the shorter route instead of a detour
to reach a reward [16].
The selective-imitation task provides an opportunity
to test whether dogs (1) automatically copy a demon-
strated action because they do not understand the im-
portance of the situational constraints, (2) use their pre-
ferred method to solve the problem unaffected by the
demonstration of the model, or (3) like children, selec-
tively re-enact the demonstrated action depending on
the constraints of the situation.
We designed an instrumental problem-solving task
comparable to the paradigm used by Gergely et al. [1],
a paradigm that required the dogs to pull down a
wooden rod to open a food container and gain a food re-
ward (Figure 1). In this situation, as shown by dogs who
were allowed to manipulate the wooden rod without
seeing any demonstration (control group, C), the pre-
ferred action for dogs to manipulate the wooden rod is
by using their mouth. Dogs of two experimental groups,
however, could observe an adult female dog that had
been trained to produce food from the apparatus by
using only her paw, thus using this ‘‘inefficient’’ action
instead of applying the method preferred by dogs. In
one group, she carried a ball in her mouth (mouth-occu-
pied group, MO), whereas in the second group, her
mouth was not occupied (mouth-free group, MF). Con-
sequently, in the first group (MO), using the ‘‘inefficient’’
action was justified by the constraints of the situation
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869Figure 1. Testing Apparatus and Pictures of the Model during the
Demonstrations
(A) To release a food reward from the apparatus, the dogs had to
either pull the wooden rod with their mouth or push it down with their
paw. The food was released from a trap door at the bottom of the ap-
paratus.
(B and C) Demonstrator producing a food reward by pushing the
wooden rod down with her paw in the mouth-occupied group (B)
or the mouth-free group (C).(analogous to the hands-occupied group in Gergely
et al.’s study [1]), whereas in the MF group, no con-
straints were present to explain the demonstrator’s inef-
fective choice (analogous to the hands-free group). In
the experiment, all 54 dogs (C: n = 14; MO: n = 21; MF:
n = 19) were first tested and if needed shortly trained
in a different but analogous situation to use both their
mouth and paw to manipulate a ring. Note that all
dogs, including the control dogs, went through that pre-
test procedure. Dogs of the mouth-occupied and
mouth-free groups and the owners of the control dogs
were allowed to watch the model dog that was obtaining
food from the test apparatus by using her paw. The dem-
onstration was accompanied by communicative cues
both from the humans and the model (see the Supple-
mental Data available online for details). Between each
of the ten demonstrations, the observer dogs were al-
lowed to retrieve the food produced by the model. Each
dog paid attention to the demonstration in at least eight
trials. It is important to note that the owners of all three
groups had the same expectation of how the apparatus
should be operated by their dog because the owners of
the control dogs also watched the mouth-free demon-
stration of the model dog several times. In addition, for
ensuring that cues by the owners (e.g., ‘‘Clever Hans’’
effect) did not influence the performance of the dogs,
one-third of the owners in each experimental condition
were blindfolded during the demonstration (please see
the Supplemental Data for detailed information).
In a subsequent test, the subjects were encouraged to
manipulate the apparatus to get the food by themselves
to see whether they match their behavior to the demon-
strated action. A trial was terminated when the dog
stopped manipulating the apparatus or a reward was
obtained. Following Meltzoff’s [17, 18] and Gergely
et al.’s [1] method, we measured the number of attempts
and successful actions the dogs used to manipulate the
wooden rod on the first trial.
All but one subject in the control group, 19 of 21 in the
mouth-occupied group, and 18 of 19 in the mouth-free
group manipulated the apparatus at least once. The
three groups showed no differences from each other in
either the latency from approaching the apparatus to
successful manipulation in the first trial (Kruskal-Wallis
test: KW = 1.438; df = 2, p = 0.487) or the number of ac-
tions performed to gain access to the food (Kruskal-
Wallis test: KW = 1.007; df = 2; p = 0.605). In all three
groups, therefore, the animals showed similar activity
and achieved similar success (see Table S1).
However, when analyzing which methods the subjects
used in the three groups, we found that only two sub-
jects in the control group (15.38%) and four subjects in
the mouth-occupied group (21.05%) manipulated the
rod with their paws, whereas 15 of 18 subjects used their
paws in the mouth-free group (83.33%) (Fisher’s exact
test, C–MO: p = 1.0; C–MF: p = 0.0003; adjusted p value:
p < 0.001; MO–MF: p = 0.0002; adjusted p value: p <
0.001; Figure 2 and Table S3). This analysis was con-
ducted to be comparable with the infants’ study. Note
that all but three dogs (MF: n = 2; MO: n =1) who used
their paws in the first trial were successful in retrieving
a food reward with this method.
The same difference between the three groups was
found when we calculated the percentage of paw use
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in the three groups (Kruskal-Wallis test: KW = 16.639;
df = 2, p = 0.0002; Dunn’s multiple-comparisons test:
C–MO: p > 0.05; C–MF: p < 0.01; MO–MF: p < 0.01; Fig-
ure 3 and Table S2). Interestingly though, most dogs in
both experimental groups used the mouth action first
(MO: n = 17; MF: n = 13) (Fisher’s exact test, p =
0.232). These differences between the experimental
groups are comparable to those obtained by Gergely
et al. in the children’s study. However, to analyze
whether the observed pattern would persist over further
trials, we conducted seven additional trials. Already in
the second trial, subjects in the mouth-occupied group
showed a high paw-use percentage similar to the dogs
in the mouth-free group, whereas control subjects con-
tinued using their mouth (Figure 3; Tables S1–S3).
Figure 2. Results of the First Test Trial
The proportion of dogs using their paw or only their mouth to manip-
ulate the apparatus in the control group (left bar), after watching the
paw action used by the demonstrator dog under the two experimen-
tal conditions (middle bar, model had mouth occupied; right bar,
model had mouth free), recorded in the first trial. Black portion for
the bars represents that paw action was re-enacted; light-gray por-
tion of the bars represents that only mouth action was used.
Figure 3. Paw Use across All Eight Test Trials
The mean percentage of mouth and paw actions of all manipulations
in the two experimental groups and the control group over all trials
(mean 6 SE). Because of the fact that some dogs refused to con-
tinue working after a few trials, the number of subjects varies in
the control and mouth-free group across trials but does not drop be-
low seven in any group. Further details are available in the Supple-
mental Data.Discussion
To our knowledge, these data provide the first evidence
that animals imitate in an inferential, selective manner.
Two alternative explanations may be raised. First, one
could argue that watching the model carrying a ball in
her mouth might have socially facilitated dogs in the
mouth-occupied but not in the mouth-free group to en-
gage in mouth manipulation and stronger pulling with
the mouth because of energizing of the mouth muscles
activated by mirror neurons [19, 20]. However, because
all dogs engaged first in mouth manipulation, readiness
toward mouth action did not differ between experimen-
tal groups. Moreover, stronger pulling would have led to
faster success in the mouth-occupied compared to the
mouth-free group, but this did not occur. Furthermore,
one could argue that, because the ball was only present
in the mouth-occupied condition, the two experimental
groups differed in their perceptual complexity. However,
nine dogs in the mouth-occupied conditions started to
use their paws as early as the second trial, suggesting
that the presence of the ball did not, in fact, prevent
them from acknowledging the paw action of the
demonstrator.
These findings encourage us to draw parallels be-
tween dogs and children in the sense that the dogs’ se-
lective re-enactment of the demonstrated action in the
first trial, like the children’s, seems to be influenced at
least by the inference about efficiency. Whether the se-
lectivity of the two experimental groups is really due to
a learning effect triggered by the communicative context
[2] needs to be elucidated in further studies. In any case,
these results reveal an interesting similarity between
dogs and human infants, a similarity that is probably
not shared with chimpanzees. In Horner and Whiten’s
[21] study, chimpanzees did not imitate an action
when it was clearly irrelevant in order to gain access to
the reward. This is contrary to the reaction of dogs and
infants, who imitated the demonstrated action when its
use was not justified. Whether this reflects simply proce-
dural or real species differences should be revealed by
more precise comparative studies. Moreover, whether
the observed selective re-enactment in the dogs would
also be persistent after a time delay as in case of the in-
fants, who showed the same performance after a 1 week
delay, also remains to be tested.
The additional test trials in our study—not available
from the infant study—revealed that the dogs in the
mouth-occupied group increased their paw use after
the first trial. This might reflect a differential memory of
the demonstrated paw action and the presence of the
ball. The manipulation of the rod and gaining a food re-
ward in the first trial might have decreased the motiva-
tional value of the ball and at the same time triggered
the memory of the observed demonstration.
The observed adoption of the paw action in the exper-
imental groups demonstrates for the first time that dogs
are able to show an imitative form of social learning. This
type of social learning from a conspecific model clearly
exceeds purely motivational and perceptual forms of so-
cial influence, such as social facilitation and stimulus en-
hancement [22], as already demonstrated in dogs [23].
It also deviates from simple forms of behavioral match-
ing, such as response facilitation, i.e., the priming of an
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cause, even though the pretest showed that all animals
had paw use in their repertoire, observers of both exper-
imental groups started out by using their mouth instead
of the demonstrated paw action to manipulate the rod.
The quick and radical shift in the mouth-free group to
adopt the paw action, for which there is no tendency in
the control group, indicates an imitative form of social
learning according to Thorpe [25], e.g., ‘‘as a significant
elevation in the frequency of an observed action over the
normal probability of its occurrence’’ [26] (reviewed in
[27–31], but see also [32, 33]).
The fact that the observers of the mouth-occupied
model did not adopt the ‘‘nonpreferred’’ model action
in the first trial compared to the mouth-free model sug-
gests that dogs, like children [1, 34], engage in inferential
selective imitation. Further studies need to determine (1)
the influence of ostensive cues on the performance of
dogs in a selective-imitation task, (2) whether this ability
is restricted to the domestic dog or shared with other
nonhuman animals, and (3) if it is restricted to dogs,
whether it results from their evolutionary history of do-
mestication or their developmental training by humans.
Experimental Procedures
Details of the training and the experimental procedures are given in
the Supplemental Data. Videos were coded by an observer blind to
the experimental conditions. Interobserver reliability for mouth and
paw actions, based on coding ten dogs from video records, was
calculated as Cohen Kappas: mouth action: 83.5% (percentage
of agreement was 95.0%) and paw action: 96.8% (percentage of
agreement was 99.4%).
Supplemental Data
Additional Experimental Procedures, three tables, and four movies
are available at http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/
17/10/868/DC1/.
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